Foster says Nvidia privately acknowledged it could track AI chips

Congress’s push to locate advanced AI chips faces a challenge to one industry objection: Representative Bill Foster says Nvidia privately told him the tracking measures were technically possible. In a November 12 interview with MIT Technology Review, Foster described assurances that contrast with an industry group’s public warning that the requirements might be infeasible.

Foster, an Illinois Democrat and a cosponsor of the Chip Security Act, said Nvidia representatives discussed the safeguards with him in technical conversations. He characterized their response as “yeah, of course we can do this.” His account concerns whether the company could implement the proposed measures—not an announcement that Nvidia has agreed to adopt them.

The Semiconductor Industry Association, which counts Nvidia as a member, opposed the bill in March 2026. It called the tracking mandates “new, untested, and potentially infeasible.” That was the trade group’s position, rather than a public technical assessment from Nvidia itself. Nvidia did not respond to MIT Technology Review’s requests for comment or confirmation of Foster’s characterization.

They never put anything in writing

Representative Bill Foster, speaking to MIT Technology Review about Nvidia’s private assurances

Three ways to establish where chips are

Introduced in May 2025, the Chip Security Act seeks to verify the location of advanced AI chips to prevent their smuggling to China. It is one of three chip-security bills under consideration for inclusion in the Senate’s National Defense Authorization Act. The tracking requirements are therefore a proposal before Congress, not an enacted obligation.

As drafted, the bill allows several ways to establish location. It does not rest solely on chips transmitting their whereabouts. The options span checks at a physical facility, statements supplied by companies, and a signal sent by the hardware itself:

• Facility inspections would provide a way to check where chips are located.
• Company attestations would let businesses formally state the location of their chips.
• Ping-based verification would require a GPU—the processor used for AI computing—to send a location signal when it comes online.

The last option has an economic argument behind it. MIT Technology Review cites a September finding from the Center for Security and Emerging Technology that ping-based verification would be the most cost-effective approach. That finding addresses the choice of tracking mechanism; Foster’s disclosure addresses Nvidia’s ability to implement the safeguards.

Finding a chip would not switch it off

Nvidia’s existing software provides relevant context, though it was built for customers. In December 2025, the company announced Fleet Intelligence to monitor chip performance across data-center locations. Nvidia confirmed to Reuters that the tool could indicate which country chips were in, according to MIT Technology Review. It did not elaborate on whether that capability could be used to prevent smuggling.

The proposed law also has a clear enforcement boundary. Its tracking mechanisms would tell investigators where chips were operating, but would not provide a way to disconnect them if they had been smuggled. Location verification and control over whether a processor can operate are separate powers under the proposals Foster described.

Foster told MIT Technology Review he intends to introduce stricter legislation in 2027 to address that gap. It would require licenses to operate advanced GPUs, with a valid license verified before a GPU could connect. That remains a future legislative plan, distinct from the location-tracking provisions now being considered for the defense bill.