Helen Clark urges autonomous-weapons treaty talks as binding rules remain unsettled
Her appeal calls for bans and human supervision. The Geneva conference must first settle the framework for further negotiations.
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Her appeal calls for bans and human supervision. The Geneva conference must first settle the framework for further negotiations.
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At the CCW’s November 16–20 review conference in Geneva, governments are expected to decide what mandate and format should guide future work on lethal autonomous weapons—not to negotiate a treaty or settle whether any instrument will be binding. Former New Zealand prime minister Helen Clark is urging them to start treaty negotiations built around human control, accountability and limits on proliferation. The practical test is whether states can agree on a negotiation framework by consensus while major questions about legal force and timing remain open.
Clark proposes banning systems unable to comply with international humanitarian law and requiring human-supervised engagement limits, testing and evaluation for other systems.
A government expert group’s September 4 report outlined possible elements but deliberately left the instrument’s legal nature open.
UN human rights chief Volker Türk called for prohibiting weapons that target people or whose effects users cannot fully understand, predict, explain and control.
Helen Clark is urging governments to negotiate a treaty that keeps autonomous weapons under human control. But the Geneva conference she is addressing has a more basic question to settle: whether future rules should be legally binding at all. The former New Zealand prime minister made her appeal in a Guardian opinion article published November 17, 2026.
Her intervention concerns the seventh review conference of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, or CCW, scheduled for November 16–20 at Geneva’s Palais des Nations. The convention restricts weapons considered to cause unnecessary suffering or strike civilians indiscriminately. Its 128 participating states face decisions about the next stage of work on lethal autonomous weapons.
Clark’s proposal is not a blanket prohibition on autonomous weapons. She calls for a treaty organized around human control, accountability and preventing their spread, with different treatment for systems that cannot meet the laws of war and those that could operate within restrictions. Her proposed framework would:
She argues that weapons designed to attack people pose especially acute risks because they struggle to distinguish combatants from journalists, civilians and children. She also warns that some technologies are cheap to produce and easy to copy, raising the risk of access by non-state armed groups, including terrorist organizations.
Clark grounds her appeal in experience challenging established military policy. She cites her role in passing New Zealand’s 1987 nuclear-free legislation, which bans nuclear weapons and nuclear-powered vessels from entering the country. She presents that history as a reason not to treat resistance from powerful militaries as insurmountable.
A weak treaty which placates those resisting accountability cannot do that.
Helen Clark, writing in the Guardian
The urgency in Clark’s argument comes from the shrinking time between finding a target and attacking it. She writes that a strike requiring about half an hour and substantial human consideration a few years ago can now take minutes or seconds. AI systems can take the lead once they meet a confidence threshold set by a human operator.
She points to AI-enabled drones in the Russia-Ukraine war operating with little or no human input during a strike’s final stages. Her concern extends beyond who approves an attack: when an autonomous system assists in a war crime, she argues, establishing accountability becomes difficult. Responsibility must remain with people and states rather than machines.
Clark’s appeal joins a conference-linked push from UN human rights chief Volker Türk. At a November 13 UN briefing, his office called for prohibiting autonomous weapons that themselves target people, whether by design or in practice. He also sought a ban on weapons whose functions and effects human users cannot fully understand, predict, explain and control.
The diplomatic groundwork is narrower than those demands. On September 4, a government expert group adopted a report containing elements of a possible instrument and other measures addressing lethal autonomous weapons. It explicitly left the instrument’s nature open. The conference is expected to consider those elements and decide the mandate and format of future work.
UN disarmament official Michael Spiess explained at the November 13 briefing that neither a binding instrument nor a timetable had been agreed. Decisions at the conference are made by consensus. He described its task as establishing the framework for further negotiations, not negotiating the weapons instrument itself.
For Clark, even agreement to begin treaty negotiations would count as progress in today’s fractured international climate. That is the immediate step she is asking governments to take—not a claim that binding limits have already been secured.
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