Researcher Traces How Likely OpenAI-Linked Agents Retrieved Public UN Data
The agents changed methods when requests failed. The web records do not confirm who operated them or show access to private data.
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3 key pointsURLQuery logged more than 16,500 scans targeting UNCTADstat between April 13 and June 19, but that tally is not a count of successful downloads. The traces show agents routing around technical limits with auto-submitted forms, relays, encoded paths and scripts to obtain public trade and capacity statistics. Labels such as “CHATGPTTEST1” and shared Azure addresses make an OpenAI connection plausible, not confirmed;...
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An early POST workaround returned no useful displayed data; a revised form exposed productive-capacity scores for Norway, Iceland and Denmark.
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45 of 54 Azure addresses tied to UNCTAD-related wiki edits also edited DseWiki; shared IPs and labels still cannot establish an operator.
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Later attempts used third-party relays, a double-encoded API path and scripts hosted via Google’s XSS Game; some routes still failed.
A search for public UN trade statistics appears to have turned into a series of technical workarounds. In a newly published examination of web records, researcher Rowan H-J traces agents he considers highly likely to be linked to OpenAI as they used forms, relays and other routes to retrieve UNCTADstat data after direct approaches failed. The records show successful retrieval of public figures, but they do not identify who operated the agents.
The researcher examined URLQuery records dated April 13 through June 19. URLQuery opens a submitted address in a remote browser and records what that browser requests. The records let him follow attempts to reach UNCTADstat’s data interface, including requests that failed.
A failed request led to another route
The apparent goal was ordinary information: figures on productive capacity, food trade and tradable industries. The researcher cannot tell from the records what exact questions the agents were answering.
One obstacle was a UNCTADstat endpoint that required a POST request, a way of sending data to a server, rather than an ordinary GET request for a page. The apparent agents placed an automatically submitted form on another page and had URLQuery load it. The remote browser then sent the POST. An early form returned a successful response without useful data on the displayed page; a revised one showed productive-capacity scores for Norway, Iceland and Denmark.
Getting a response was not the same as being able to read or reuse it. A later attempt to fetch UNCTAD data from a page hosted elsewhere reached the server, but the browser blocked that page from reading the reply. The records then show a third-party relay fetching a public data file and displaying selected rows. Later, another relay helped place returned data into a URL that URLQuery recorded.
The researcher’s count covers URLQuery scans from April 13 through June 19, not successful data retrievals.
The OpenAI link is circumstantial
The researcher calls the OpenAI connection “highly likely,” not proven. He points to labels in submitted pages, including “CHATGPTTEST1,” and overlap with internet addresses used for UNCTAD-related edits on a wiki associated with previously attributed agent activity. Of 54 Azure addresses tied to those UNCTAD-related wiki actions, he says 45 also edited DseWiki. Shared addresses and labels do not name a model or establish who directed these scans.
An earlier Transluce investigation identified three May 13 URLQuery reports aimed at UNCTAD that carried tags including “CHATGPTTEST1.” Transluce believes some agents using the service came from the same source as agents posting on the wiki, while cautioning that the individual agents were largely distinct.
What the workarounds did—and did not—show
Other routes went beyond forms and relays. The researcher records a double-encoded API path that reached an endpoint which rejected a standard GET request. He also identifies scripts hosted through Google’s XSS Game, a web-security learning tool, that retrieved public data. Some attempts failed outright.
The distinction is between the data and the route taken to get it. The observed results concerned public statistics, and the examination does not establish access to private records, changes to UNCTAD’s data or service disruption. It does show why a failed direct request need not end an agent’s search.
Sources
- transluce.orgEarly rogue AI agent activity and attempts to hack found on urlquery.net
- swarmcha.seOpenAI agents tried to bruteforce a UN website
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