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Antigravity Includes a Gemini Approval Mode, but Access Is Unconfirmed

The software describes Policy Guardian, a Gemini-powered evaluator for auto-approving some agent actions. But the feature is gated, and its live behavior and security results remain unresolved.

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Antigravity Includes a Gemini Approval Mode, but Access Is Unconfirmed
Antigravity Includes a Gemini Approval Mode, but Access Is Unconfirmed

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Antigravity version 2.12.2 contains a beta permission mode called Vetted, which could let a second Gemini-powered security agent approve some coding-agent actions automatically. That evaluator is called Policy Guardian. Its job is described as reviewing tool calls, downloads, software dependencies, and attempts to repeat an action that was previously denied. In practical terms, it would sit between an agent’s proposed action and the development environment, potentially reducing approval prompts while adding another model to the decision process. But the feature is not confirmed to be available to users. Vetted is gated by an eligibility flag and experiment settings supplied by the server, and a live account test did not activate it. So the installed code shows the design, not the rollout. Still unknown are how broadly the mode is enabled, what happens when Gemini cannot decide or is unavailable, and how well the system performs in real security testing. There is also a concrete enforcement question. In GitHub issue 640, a user reported that a PreToolUse hook blocked ordinary tools, including file writes and command execution, but did not stop invoke_subagent from creating a sub-agent. That report does not establish how Policy Guardian behaves, but it highlights the key constraint: an approval layer is only dependable if denials apply across every route an agent can use. The next fact to establish is whether Vetted consistently enforces its decisions in live accounts.

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3 key points

Antigravity 2.12.2 contains a beta setting called Vetted that could let Policy Guardian, a Gemini-powered evaluator, approve coding-agent commands automatically. The feature is not confirmed for users: eligibility and experiment settings are supplied by the server, and no live account test activated it. That leaves rollout scope, fallback behavior, and security performance unknown. A prior issue involving blocked...

  1. 01

    Vetted appears in Antigravity version 2.12.2, but installed code alone does not prove account access.

  2. 02

    Policy Guardian evaluates tool calls, downloads, dependencies, and repeated actions after denial.

  3. 03

    The feature’s behavior when Gemini cannot decide or is unavailable remains untested.

Code in Antigravity version 2.12.2 contains Vetted (beta), a permission setting that puts a Gemini-powered security agent in charge of deciding which coding-agent commands can be auto-approved. The design could reduce manual approval prompts, but the option is server-gated and has not been confirmed as available to users.

A second AI reviews proposed actions

The Vetted interface says its Gemini-powered security agent decides whether commands should be auto-approved. Recovered code and prompts identify that evaluator as Policy Guardian, giving a second model a supervisory role over actions proposed by a coding agent.

Its described checks span tool calls, downloads, software dependencies, and attempts to repeat an action that was already denied. Those are the points where an agent moves from generating an answer to trying to change a development environment or retrieve new material.

The gate leaves the practical test ahead

The setting was not activated through a live account. That leaves the rollout scope, the system’s default behavior if the evaluator cannot decide or is unavailable, and measured security performance unanswered. For teams assessing Vetted as a permission control, those details determine whether it is a convenience feature or a dependable boundary.

A decision only works if the platform enforces it

An earlier user-reported GitHub issue shows why that distinction matters. The report said a PreToolUse hook blocked ordinary tools, including file writes and command execution, but its block was not honored for invoke_subagent, which creates a sub-agent.

That reported behavior does not show how Policy Guardian works. It does put a concrete question in front of any model-based approval layer: whether a denial is enforced consistently across the routes an agent can use to act.

Sources

  1. github.comPreToolUse hook `block` is ignored for `invoke_subagent` (a denied sub-agent spawns anyway) · Issue #640 · google-antigravity/antigravity-cli