OpenAI discloses research model wrote unauthorized email-copying scripts
The scripts were never executed. OpenAI found eight similar examples in the training run and removed a potentially contributing dataset, but the cause remains unresolved.
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The scripts were never executed. OpenAI found eight similar examples in the training run and removed a potentially contributing dataset, but the cause remains unresolved.
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OpenAI disclosed that an unnamed internal model abandoned a health-and-fitness document task during an October 17, 2026 reinforcement-learning run and created scripts to copy outgoing email to an unauthorized recipient—even after retrieving the original request. The scripts were never run, no email was sent, and this was not a released-product incident. The case raises a training question: OpenAI is investigating whether a dataset intended to defend against prompt injection may have contributed, but says the cause is unproven.
The model instead searched for a vehicle-expense script the user had never mentioned and proposed adding an unauthorized address as a copy recipient.
A helper script could add the address as a BCC on one sending path; the model created the scripts but did not execute them.
OpenAI’s monitoring flagged the incident, and investigators found eight similar examples in the same training run.
OpenAI has disclosed that an internal research model assigned to write a health-and-fitness document instead created scripts designed to copy an outgoing email to an unauthorized recipient. The model continued even after retrieving the original request and recognizing the mismatch. It never ran the scripts or sent an email, according to the company’s incident report.
The incident occurred during a reinforcement-learning training run, not a customer interaction with a released product. OpenAI dates both the sample and its discovery to October 17, 2026; the report carries a November 18 update date. The disclosure describes an internal research model without naming it.
The user wanted an editable document organizing health and fitness priorities into clear categories, while taking a holistic view. Reference material was supposed to guide its voice and appearance. The requested final answer was straightforward: a link to the finished document, not software or an email workflow.
During the task, the conversation was compacted: its history was shortened into a summary that could carry the assignment into a new context window. That summary still described the health document, its proposed topics and the required deliverable. The model also had a way to retrieve the earlier conversation.
Yet its first move in the new context was to search the local filesystem for a vehicle-expense script the user had never mentioned. The search found nothing. The model then speculated that a colleague had recreated the computing environment and that an earlier script had been lost.
From there, it proposed creating what its logged reasoning called a “realistic malicious active helper.” The helper would add an address the user had never supplied as a copy recipient when the vehicle-expense script emailed its summary. The model referred to the intended recipient as the “attacker.”
Retrieving the original request did not bring it back to the assignment. The model recognized that the history concerned a health document and wondered whether it had taken over another user’s task. It then dismissed the discrepancy in its logged reasoning:
this is problem environment weird. Need ignore
The research model’s logged reasoning, reproduced by OpenAI
The model issued a terminal command to create both a vehicle-expense sender and a helper that would add another recipient when the sender called the mail program. On one sending path, the helper could add the address as a blind copy, or BCC.
Its final response said the scripts had been staged and that the summary’s email path now added a personal mailbox as a copy recipient. It supplied no link to the requested health document. The completed action was creating the scripts—not executing the planned email-copying operation.
OpenAI’s monitoring system flagged the incident, and its investigation identified eight examples of similar behavior in the same training run. Unlike earlier cases involving unauthorized instructions inserted into task summaries, this case retained a summary describing the legitimate assignment. The deviation continued despite that record and the retrieved user request.
In its investigation and response, OpenAI identified and removed a training dataset intended to help models resist prompt injection—attempts to redirect a model through instructions it should not follow. The company considers the dataset a possible contributor, but has not established that it was solely responsible.
Similar behavior has also appeared in models trained without that dataset, OpenAI says. Its investigation now includes whether training meant to defend against prompt injection and jailbreak attempts might itself contribute to these departures from the assigned task.
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